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International institutions are obliged to consider various development paths for countries that 
often are dependent on natural resources as the primary source of wealth creation. However, 
during the past decade, serious doubts have been raised about the role of natural resources 
in development. Researchers not only have questioned the role of natural resources in 
development but they also have posited a link between natural resources and violent conflict 
— thus leading to use of the term “resource curse.” No doubt there have been justifiable 
concerns about the use of natural resources in funding wars; the U.N.Security Council itself 
has convened special panels to investigate this link in the cases of the Democratic Republic 
of Congo and Liberia. However, the findings of such linkages cannot be used as a blanket 
indictment of extractive industries as the term “resource curse” may imply.
Most notable among the originators of the resource curse hypothesis are Richard Auty (2001) 
and Paul Collier (2003). Using the ratio of the financial value of primary commodity exports over 
gross domestic product (GDP) as a measure of natural resource abundance, Collier and Anke 
Hoeffler found a significant relationship with violent conflict. More specifically, they found that 
the risk of civil war onset was greatest when the GDP share of primary commodity exports for 
a country was around 35 percent and the risk declined as the share increased from there (thus 
explaining relative calm in large exporters such as Botswana). Some subsequent cross-national 
statistical analyses also found that natural resource abundance in a particular sector (such as oil 
or minerals) rather than environmental scarcity was a cause of violent conflict (DeSoysa 2002).
Several environmental and human rights groups such as Oxfam, Global Witness, Earthworks, 
and the Worldwatch Institute have supported this “honey pot” perspective in their own 
research and analysis, for example, on cases of conflict over diamonds. Some researchers have 
found that the implementation of peace agreements is likely to be more difficult in countries 
abundant in natural resources and can also pose difficulties in postwar peace-building efforts 
(Stedman 2001). The list of studies is almost endless, with each scholar trying to find a way to 
capture the complexity of national destiny through ever-more complex numerical analyses. 
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Depending on the assumptions and resolution of the regression, there have been highly 
divergent findings on conflict linkages with mineral economies as well. For example, James 
Fearon and colleagues found no such link despite including a relatively comparable set of civil 
wars in their data set and operationalizing resource abundance in the exact same way as Collier 
and  Hoeffler (Fearon et al. 2003). In a follow-up article, Fearon (2005) confirmed again 
that minor departures from the Collier and Hoeffler approach, such as using year-long data 
rather than grouping data in five-year intervals or employing a multiple imputation statistical 
methodology to include cases with missing data, 
resulted in primary commodity exports no longer 
being associated with civil war in statistical terms. 
Despite such revisionist studies, this narrative 
has considerable influence among activists, 
particularly in the context of oil economies.
Oil and Turmoil?
Proponents of the resource curse theory 
postulate that oil abundance is particularly 
pernicious, not primarily because of its financial 
value to rebels, but because oil-abundant 
countries tend to lack strong state bureaucracies. Oil abundance minimizes the need to 
collect general tax revenues, which is often one of the major functional reasons for building 
capacious state agencies. The statistical results support the weak state hypothesis, but many 
of the measures widely used to gauge state strength — government observance of contracts 
and investor perception of expropriation risk — are not particularly compelling proxies. This 
argument and supporting evidence of weak state institutions being associated with civil war 
outbreak is ironically consistent with the ideas and results offered by scarcity researchers 
that strong political institutions can reduce the likelihood of violent conflict in developing 
countries. In perhaps the most comprehensive conceptual and statistical work to date, 
Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey Sachs and Joseph Stiglitz (2007) find support for the weak state 
mechanism rather than rebel financing hypothesis. Conflict initiation is correlated with past 
resource production (for both oil and diamonds) rather than potential future production (oil 
stocks). But the findings also indicate that natural resource abundance affects conflict onset 
independently of state strength. Contrary to previous research, this study also noted that 
violent conflicts in which natural resources are at stake tend to be shorter in duration and 
often end in the military defeat of one of the combatants.
The debate between environmental abundance and scarcity approaches has not progressed 
very far, partly because the scholars in these communities typically do not engage directly with 
each other. Perhaps even more importantly, there are clear differences in research style and 
the philosophy of knowledge between the two perspectives. Indeed, some systemic problems 
of dependence have been identified in terms of economies that export natural resources 
because they lead to a stifling of local manufacturing industries. The process begins with a 
rise in exchange rates due to increasing exports, which in turn makes local manufacturing less 
attractive and entangles the public sector intimately with business interests. This phenomenon 
occurred in Holland in the mid-20th century when natural gas was discovered, giving rise to 
the term “Dutch Disease.” Yet, the country was clearly able to overcome any effects that may 
have occurred through policy innovation as it is now one of the more prosperous countries 
in Europe. Mineral economist Graham Davis (1993) suggests that countries with resource 
“... weak state institutions being associated 
with civil war outbreak is ironically 
consistent with the ideas and results offered 
by scarcity researchers that strong political 
institutions can reduce the likelihood of 
violent conflict in developing countries.” 
endowments can reconfigure the windfall revenues in a way that they can “learn to love the 
Dutch Disease.” However, he also finds in more recent analyses that without proper planning 
the declining share of mineral revenues can lead to a loss of developmental progress as 
exemplified by countries such as Zambia (Davis chapter in Richards 2009). 
These analyses have in turn been coupled with theories of governmental failure at various 
levels. Countries dependent on natural resources have been termed “Rentier States,” 
characterized by a lack of dependence on tax revenues due to mineral royalties and hence 
reduced accountability as well. Additionally, the mineral royalties could be spent on either 
buying political favors or repressing the population. Using similar logic, Michael Ross, who 
has spent much of his career studying the resource curse through regressions, has gone so 
far as to propose that oil is to blame for women’s rights violations in the Middle East (Ross 
2008). Although Ross’s analysis may be impeccable from the point of view of quantitative 
methodology, it raises fundamental questions about how much one can suitably infer from 
regressions that are unable to account for myriad cultural variables that are coincident with 
geological availability of oil. Exonerating cultural factors and the nuances of development in 
such stark causality can clearly be quite dangerous from a policy perspective.  
With the growing influence of globalization on national policies, some of the fears of 
resource dependency, particularly in Africa, and its connection to corruption may be 
assuaged. For example, consider Equatorial Guinea, which has been a under the same ruler 
since its independence from Spain in 1968. After the discovery of oil in the mid-1990s, 
the international community became more engaged with this tiny country. The United 
States reopened its embassy in Malabo in 2003, and the State Department asserts that 
U.S. “intervention has resulted in positive developments,” such as an office to monitor the 
human rights situation. The viability of such a mechanism as a means of initiating change in 
Equatorial Guinea was tested by a U.S. Senate hearing and an investigation by the Office of 
the Comptroller of Currency into the siphoning of funds from oil revenues to private bank 
accounts in 2004. None of this would have happened if the salience of Equatorial Guinea 
had not been brought to the world’s attention by oil. Such a trajectory and the questionable 
linkage between oil and authoritarianism are also being empirically challenged by recent 
studies (Haber and Menaldo 2009). Yet 
the onus for exerting positive influence 
once corruption is exposed still lies with 
the international community, who need 
to push for reform once such exposure 
is made possible through scrutiny of 
natural resource wealth. Without a 
unified stance against violations of 
agreements at the international level, ad 
hoc accountability arrangements such 
as those instituted by the World Bank in 
the case of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline, 
can still fail (Pegg 2006). 
Improved domestic regulation is another pathway to prevent abuse of oil revenues or 
the hegemonic influence of companies. Overall, regulatory capacity of governments in 
developing countries over oil activities has grown. Some governments have gained expertise 
in the technical matters of the oil business, improved their capacity to negotiate concession 
contracts and regulate social and environmental issues. For example, Chevron-Texaco got 
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developing countries over oil activities has grown. 
Some governments have gained expertise in the 
technical matters of the oil business, improved 
their capacity to negotiate concession contracts 
and regulate social and environmental issues.” 
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a US$2 million fine from Angolan authorities because of an oil spill in the sea in 2002. Even 
though companies have a history of oil spills and pollution in the region, this was the first 
time an oil company was fined because of environmental degradation in Africa. Chevron-
Texaco also compensated local fishermen for losses in their incomes. However, such cases 
are still few and far between and there is clearly far greater need for local law enforcement of 
environmental and social regulations. 
exceptions or examples?
Most of the world’s major economic and educational powers have depended at some point in 
their development path on the exploitation of natural resources — the United States, Canada, 
Norway, and Australia being foremost among them. In many cases extractive industries have 
been necessary and desirable ingredients in the development trajectory. The key challenge, 
then, is to find the best structural mechanisms to make resources work for communities 
and for society as a whole. Finding the right mix of market incentives, regulation, planning 
mechanisms, and community vigilance is essential in 
making effective use of resources for development and for 
ensuring conservation of the natural life-support systems 
on which we depend. 
Much of the alarm regarding oil in Africa stems from 
the admittedly troubling experiences of the continent’s 
largest oil producer and most populous country — 
Nigeria. For more than 50 years, oil has been extracted 
from the southern part of the country, known as 
the Niger delta, and yet many of the most oil-rich 
communities are utterly impoverished and may not 
even have cooking oil available for their homes. How did those communities that bore the 
brunt of the occupational and environmental hazards of oil extraction not benefit from the 
bonanza? The answer largely lies in a misconceived attempt at national wealth allocation 
that befell Nigeria in the postcolonial era. A country already fractured by ethnic and religious 
differences tried to extract wealth from one location and invest whatever escaped the clutches 
of corruption through a process of demographic prioritization. Urban areas were thus given 
priority, and lavish expenditure was incurred in building a new planned capital (Abuja). Thus 
the diabolical confluence of errant planning, poor leadership, artificially crafted national 
geographies, and apathy from multinational corporate investors pushed the country into 
chaos. Much to Nigeria’s misfortune, it received investment from foreign companies at a time 
of minimal corporate accountability and transparency. There is little doubt that the extractive 
sector has historically had a strong linkage to corruption. In one study conducted by the 
Gallup organization, the supply side of international bribery was analyzed by developing a 
Bribe Payer’s Index. Oil, gas, and mining had the most negative ranking in this index, after the 
arms industry.
The question in such eventualities is whether the situation might have been any better if oil 
had not been discovered. Would alternative sources of income have been available to sustain 
the population and would conflicts have been averted? In countries such as Saudi Arabia, 
Malaysia, or even Venezuela, some opportunity cost analysis of alternative sectors would 
probably suggest that oil in aggregate made things better in terms of development indicators. 
However, Nigeria’s Niger delta is a region where oil actually diminished the development 
prospects for that part of the country because the alternative livelihoods of the communities 
www.bu.edu/pardee
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were themselves impaired. Agriculture, 
fishing, and the potential for tourism 
all were harmed by the negligent way 
that oil was extracted. Clearly, this 
is an undesirable outcome for other 
countries to consider. However, once 
these systemic roots of turmoil in 
the Nigerian case are appropriately 
considered, we should apply those 
lessons in future development efforts. 
Some of the most remarkable success 
stories of development such as 
Botswana, Malaysia and Chile have 
been mineral producers, and must 
not be dismissed as outliers, while 
recognizing that any developmental 
progress is reversible without proper 
planning for resource depletion. 
There are even cases when mineral 
resources have helped a community to 
escape some of the most pernicious 
aspects of colonialism as exemplified 
by the Royal Bafokeng Nation in 
South Africa. This community 
of approximately 300,000 has 
maintained relative autonomy 
within the country and is economically self-reliant owing to a huge reserve of platinum on 
its land. The community was initially assisted in maintaining its land and resources with 
the help of Lutheran missionaries who kept land titles on behalf of the community during 
apartheid. One of the world’s largest platinum reserves was found on their land in 1921, and 
a protracted struggle to assert rights over this reserve ensued. Ultimately, the community won 
its legal battles and the platinum has been an enormously beneficial source of income for the 
community and in setting precedents for self-determination in South Africa (Manson and 
Mbinga 2003).
Diamond producing states also present an interesting range of comparisons when one 
disaggregates artisanal mining of alluvial diamonds versus large-scale mining (Figure 1).
For development agencies it is essential to glean key lessons from these cases and see whether 
they can be replicated effectively with various changes. The most important criteria for 
success in this regard is effective mechanisms of governance that can hold all stakeholders to 
account over a longer time horizon.
accountability and assurance Mechanisms 
As international norms for accountability evolve, the fear that resource endowments will 
be misused economically is abating. In 2007, 41 financial institutions agreed to a revised 
version of “The Equator Principles” for ensuring social and environmental consciousness in 
their investment decisions. The British government has been leading the Extractive Industries 
www.bu.edu/pardee
figure 1  Formal diamond mining (as a percentage of all diamond mining) in 
selected African countries, and individual well-being as measured by the U.N.’s 
Human Development Index. The size of the circles represents total annual diamond 
production. 
Source: De Beers Report to Stakeholders, 2007, based on data from the U.S. Geological Survey, U.N. 
Development Program, and Partnership Africa, Canada.
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Transparency Initiative (EITI) that aims to recruit governments to establish constructive 
action plans for resource revenues. The Kimberley Process for diamond certification and 
the partnership between jewelry manufacturers and groups such as Earthworks and Oxfam 
on “clean gold usage” are promising signs of constructive engagement. Such efforts are far 
too easily labeled as “greenwash,” and deserve more credit and time to mature; they are 
likely to be successful as they gain traction. The key to their success is having non-politicized 
compliance assurance mechanisms, which can be accomplished by external auditing boards 
that are given authority to enforce the terms of the process. 
Curing the social ailments of resource dependence is possible 
but requires us to consider clear mechanisms and be ready 
and willing to innovate as demanded by the times. Some of the 
peculiarities of large-scale investments in the mineral sector 
such as a lengthy exploration phase for project development, 
and captive capital once the mine is built, have to be taken into 
account as well.
The U.S. state of Alaska provides an interesting example of how 
windfall wealth was managed in order to avoid corruption. The 
state has a history of considerable poverty and deprivation, 
especially among its indigenous inhabitants, since the U.S. 
bought it from Russia for a paltry $7.2 million in 1867 (this 
amounted to roughly 1.9 cents per acre and would amount to approximately $105 million 
current dollars). Despite its arctic climate, residence in Alaska is much sought after and 
considerably difficult to achieve because of the state’s oil wealth. Every resident has a stake 
in this wealth because of an innovative system created in 1976 to ensure long-term stability 
of the state’s economy. Funded through royalty payments to the state from oil extraction, 
the fund started with roughly $700,000 and is now worth more than $40 billion. Each year, 
all citizens of Alaska get a dividend payment from the fund, which was about $1700 in 2007. 
The fund’s ultimate goal is to provide an investment base for economic diversification for 
Alaska’s economy once the oil stops flowing. Similar arrangements have also been made by the 
Norwegian government, which now has a petroleum fund estimated at around $200 billion. 
However, such funds require good management, transparency, and delivery.
Conclusions
The transformation of natural resource wealth to productive enterprise and livelihoods 
is an ongoing challenge; it can entice us into rash behavior but can also catalyze lasting 
development. Appreciating the ephemeral state of mineral resources in their natural form 
is essential to avoid the eventuality of a resource curse. Yet the very evanescence of an ore 
deposit may lead some to rush and ravenously exploit the resource while prices are high and 
each extractor asks that fundamentally selfish question: “how long will the good times last?” 
This is where planning criteria have to guide us into moderating the speed and steering the 
trajectory of resource exploitation. Some key points for development agencies to consider in 
this regard include:
•   The full range of livelihoods that may be available to the community for capital generation 
based on the area’s ecology and geographic constraints. The opportunity costs of various 
prospects need to be compared with community consultation through deliberative 
processes.
www.bu.edu/pardee
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us into rash behavior but can also 
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•   The processes that will be used for extraction and whether ecological restoration would 
be possible afterwards. This is especially important for nonrenewable resources so that 
communities can still use the land productively after extraction is finished.
•   The establishments of trust funds and other revenue management systems by donors and 
corporations. In the new paradigm of corporate social responsibility, it is not enough to 
shift the blame to the government but rather to ensure that the funds are appropriately 
managed. International institutions, such as EITI need to be strengthened to ensure that 
state sovereignty is not used to trump effective revenue management regimes.
•   Some level of state ownership to ensure appropriate wealth transfer to local populations. 
Foreign capital and partnership with multinationals usually have an important role to 
play earlier on in the exploration and development cycle but eventually, as institutions 
develop, some level of state ownership is usually beneficial to protect the interests of local 
populations. 
•   Communities that bear the impact of extraction must be the first to reap the rewards. If 
wealth is being extracted from one region of the country, the development plan must give 
preference to that region in terms of poverty alleviation even if demographic indicators may 
suggest giving preference to other more populous part of the country. .
•   The speed of mineral extraction must be calibrated with the capacity to manage the 
revenues effectively and to restore the land that has already been mined. Mineral resources, 
in particular, are fixed stocks whose value can only increase with scarcity in the future. 
Hence a rush to extract is not justifiable unless ecological constraints of impact and 
revenue management are ensured.
Mineral endowments are an accident of geography, and for development agencies they can 
certainly be an essential tool for spurring economic activity. Even though the extraction itself 
may be nonrenewable on human timescales, it can be a catalyst for capital flows that can 
provide for lasting development. By having a long-term planning horizon on mineral projects 
from exploration to closure and post-closure revenue management, we can envision a brighter 
future for countries with such resources. •
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